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Abstract 
In the canonical examples underlying Shafer-Dempster theory, 
beliefs over the hypotheses of interest are derived from a 
probability model for a set of auxiliary hypotheses. Beliefs 
are derived via a compatibility relation connecting the 
auxiliary hypotheses to subsets of the primary hypotheses. A 
belief function differs from a Bayesian probability model in 
that one does not condition on those parts of the evidence for 
which no probabilities are specified. The significance of 
this difference in conditioning assumptions is illustrated with 
two examples giving rise to identical belief functions but dif­
ferent Bayesian probability distributions. 
Introduction 
The artificial intelligence community is in the midst of a lively debate 
over the representation and manipulation of uncertainty. There is a 
growing recognition of the need for a numerical uncertainty calculus for 
at least some classes of problems. A glance through last year's 
proceedings for this workshop identifies two leading contenders for this 
role: probability theory and the Shafer-Dempster theory of belief func­
tions. These two theories are closely related. Belief functions are 
based on probabilities, although common interpretations of beliefs as 
lower bounds on probabilities are easily shown to be incorrect. 
The theory of belief functions lacks the axiomatic foundation of prob­
ability theory, but (not coincidentally) Shafer argues that such 
axiomatic justifications are unnecessary. People do not come to a 
problem with beliefs "in their heads," waiting to be elicited. Rather, 
argues Shafer, beliefs should be constructed in a process of comparing 
one's real-life problem to canonical examples of a theory. Bayesian 
theory, says Shafer, is based on canonical examples in which the truth 
is generated according to known chances. In contrast, belief functions 
arise from canonical examples in which the meaning of the evidence is 
governed by chance. Choose the theory, says Shafer, for which the 
canonical examples best match your problem. 
This constructive approach has obvious appeal, and has been advanced by 
Bayesian thinkers as well (e. g. Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaiffer, 1964) . 
With this approach, Bayesian theory is dethroned from a lofty (but 
undeserved) position: there is no uniquely justifiable inference 
theory. Bayesian theory applies only to the extent that the problem at 
hand "resembles" the theory's canonical examples. 
1. Work supported in part by U. S. Army Communications­
Electronics Command, Contract No. DAAB07-86-C-A052. 
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Yet the soundness of a constructive argument depends on more than 
whether a problem matches a theory's examples. We also need a compell­
ing rationale for why the theory operates as it does on its canonical 
examples. In this context, the role of axiomatic derivations becomes 
clear: they form a compelling link between Bayesian theory and certain 
canonical examples. Is there an equally compelling connection between 
Shafer's canonical examples and the operations his theory performs on 
the examples? Shafer appeals to intuition--he argues that the beliefs 
his theory assigns seem reasonable given the statement of the canonical 
examples. Of course, some residue of any theory's justification must be 
left to our intuitions about what are "reasonable" properties. Yet 
Shafer's examples are complex, and the intuitive leap from example 
statement to beliefs may not be immediately obvious. 
This paper attempts to clarify the connection between examples and 
theory by comparing Shafer's model of his examples to a Bayesian ap­
proach to the same examples. We shall see that belief function models 
are incompletely specified probability models, in which probabilities 
are specified for only some aspects of a problem (Shafer, 1984). Belief 
function models are incoherent from the Bayesian perspective because we 
are not allowed to condition on that part of the evidence which is not 
modeled probabilistically. On the other hand, coherence would require a 
willingness (at least in principle) to assign probabilities to any 
event, whether or not it makes sense to do so. The difference between 
the two approaches is made concrete by illustrating two situations which 
could never lead to the same probability model but which give rise to 
identical belief functions. 
2. A Canonical Example 
The story of the coded message is used repeatedly by Shafer as a canoni­
cal example. We begin with two (finite) sets, S and T, called "frames 
of discernment" by Shafer. The set T is the set of hypotheses of inter­
est to us. We may think of the "truth" teT as only partially observ­
able, in the sense that someone other than ourselves has ascertained 
that t lies in some subset�. We think of the subset A as a plaintext 
message, "the truth lies in A." The set S contains codes, or functions 
which carry plaintext messages A to some set Q (i.e., an element s of S 
is a function s: 2T�). We do not get to observe A. Instead, a code s 
is chosen randomly according to a probability distribution P(·), and we 
receive the message q = s(A). For concreteness, let us consider 
Example 1: A spy is sent to discover whether the enemy intends to 
attack at dawn. The spy observes a non-empty subset of T -{yes, 
no} (i.e. she may observe A= {yes}, the enemy will attack; A­
{no}, the enemy will not attack; or A-T, she is unable to deter­
mine whether the enemy will attack). The set of messages is Q­
{APPLE, BANANA, CHERRY}. The possible codes are s1 and s2, with 
probabilities P(s1) -1/3, and P(s2) = 2/3, and values: 
s1 ({yes}) 
s2 ({yes}) 
APPLE; 
APPLE; 
s1({no}) 
s2 ({no}) 
CHERRY; 
BANANA; 
BANANA; and 
CHERRY. 
The spy sends the message q -BANANA. The problem is to determine 
a reasonable degree of belief for whether the enemy will attack. 
Shafer's other canonical examples have a similar structure. The cover 
stories differ, but in each case there are two frames, S and T. Prob-
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abilities P(·) are defined on S, but not on the hypotheses of interest 
T. The evidence consists of the probability distribution P(·) and a 
subset E of Sx2T which acts as a constraining relation: if we learned 
which sES was chosen, we would know that t belonged to some subset �T 
for which (s,A)EE. In Example 1, E = {(s1,T), (s2,{no})}. 
A belief function on T is derived by extending the probability distribu­
tion P(·) to the power set 2T. Define s1 = {s: (s,A)EE for some A} to 
be the set of those s which could have occurred given the evidence E. 
Define C(s) = U{A: (s,A)EE} to be the set of those t compatible with s 
given E. A basic probability distribution is defined over 2T by 
m(A) I P(siSl) 
C(s)=A 
(1) 
The belief function is computed from the basic probability distribution 
by 
Bel(A) I m(B) . (2) 
BcA 
In Example 1, C(s1) = T and C(s2) = {no}. All codes are possible, so s1 
- S, and the basic probabilities are 
m(0) = m({yes}) = 0; m({no}) = 2/3; m(T) = 1/ 3. (3) 
Belief in an attack is Bel({yes}) = 0; belief in no attack is Bel({no}) 
- 2/3. To the extent that beliefs fail to sum to 1, belief is not com­
mitted directly to singleton hypotheses (in this example, belief of 1/3 
is committed to T, but not allocated between its elements). 
Thus, in the coded message example, the basic probability of a set A is 
determined by summing the probabilities for all those codes that decode 
to the set A, after first conditioning on the set of codes that are pos­
sible given the message q (this step ensures that basic probabilities 
sum to 1). Shafer regards it as intuitively clear that (2) defines 
reasonable degrees of belief for the coded message example. Bel(A) is 
"interpreted as the probability that the evidence means or implies" that 
tEA (in press, p. 31), and "m(A) is, in a certain sense, the total 
chance that the true message was A," (1981, p. 5) . This does not mean, 
he adds in a note, that A is drawn randomly from the distribution m(·): 
"It is just that m(A) is the sum of the chances for those codes that 
decode our encoded message to A." Despite this caveat, readers are 
likely to interpret m(A) as the (Bayesian) probability that the true 
message was A. We shall see later that this interpretation is wrong. 
3. Dempster's Rule 
The basic combination rule for belief functions has a natural inter­
pretation within the formalism of Shafer's canonical examples. Suppose 
S and U are two sets of codes, and codes sES and uEU are chosen indepen­
dently according to distributions P(·) and R(·), respectively. We ob­
serve coded messages q1 = s(A1) and q2 = u(A2), where A1 and A2 are the 
contents of the true plaintext messages. We now have two constraining 
relations, E1 = {(s,A1): s(A1)=q1} and E2 = {(u,A2): u(A2)=q2}. We may 
combine these into a single set E as follows. Suppose (s,A1) and (u,A2) 
are the true codes and plaintext messages. This means that the truth t 
is constrained to lie in both A1 and A2, that is, in their intersection 
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A=A1nA2. Ruling out impossible combinations, we obtain a combined con­
straining relationE = {(s,u,A) : � .  A=A1nA2, s(A1) =q1, u(A2) =q2}. The 
probability distribution over SxU is given by the product distribution 
Pr(s,u) = P(s) ·R(u) (because the codes were chosen independently) , and 
extended to a belief function exactly as before. The set su1 is defined 
as {(s,u) :(s,u,A) E  for some A}, the set of codes compatible with E. 
The set C(s,u) is defined as U{A: (s,u,A) E }, the set of t compatible 
with codes s and u. Then 
m(A) L Pr(s,ui SU1) 
C(s,u) =A 
1 L P(s) R(u) 
C(s,u) =A 
(4) 
Conditioning on the set su1 of compatible codes is the usual normaliza­
tion step of Dempster's Rul e. The belief function then comes from (2) . 
4. Belief Functions and Bayesian Probabilities 
Equation (4) makes it clear that both the construction of belief func­
tions from Shafer's canonical examples and the application of Dempster's 
Rule follow from the framework outlined in Section 2. The basic ele­
ments are (i) two frames S [ SxU in (4) ] and T; and (ii) evidence con­
sisting of a probability distribution on S and a constraining relation E 
which specifies which subsets of T are compatible with each se S. No 
probabilities are defined over T. To derive degrees of belief over T, 
we first form a conditional probability distribution over S, ruling out 
elements incompatible with the evidence E. We then compute the degree 
of belief in A by summing the conditional probabilities for s such that 
A contains the set C(s) of t compatible with s. 
Shafer (in press) argues that this extension of the distribution P(·) to 
Bel(·) is entirely natural when S "mediates the interaction" between the 
evidence and T. This means, he says, that "the evidence bears on the 
question considered by T only indirectly, through its relevance to the 
question considered by S. " That this is the case in the coded message 
example is regarded by Shafer as obvious. 
To a Bayesian, this is a curious argument: the set E gives information 
jointly about S and T. Suppose, prior to observing the message q, we 
had placed a distribution over the possible plaintext messages A. As­
sume the codes are chosen independently of the plaintext message A (a 
clear implication of the sense of the example) . If the codes are one­
to-one (i. e. a single A compatible with each s given the message q) , 
then it can be shown that m(A) is the posterior probability of A given 
E, if all A were a priori equally likely (Williams, 1982) .  Otherwise, 
the interpretation of m(A) as the posterior probability of A is er­
roneous. Because E contains information about both the code s and the 
plaintext message A, the posterior probabilities depend on both the 
probabilities P(·) over S and the prior probabilities of subsets Ac T. 
The result cited above means that a belief function model for the coded 
message example with one-to-one codes is mathematically equivalent to a 
Bayesian model in which plaintext messages A are assigned equal prior 
probabilities, and m(A) is the posterior probability of A given E. 
Despite this formal equivalence, Shafer argues that belief function 
models are not Bayesian--"they have their own logic. " The Bayesian ar­
gument applies only when we think it appropriate to assign probabilities 
to the plaintext messages. If, on the other hand, it seems appropriate 
to attach probabilities to the codes but not to the plaintext messages 
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or to teT, then we should use the probabilities over S to define beliefs 
for T as in (1) and (2) .  We condition only on those aspects of the 
evidence for which we have specified a probability model. 
To a Bayesian, it would always be possible in principle to put probabil­
ities on the plaintext messages. If these probabilities are not 
specified, the Bayesian would either assign them by assumption (e.g., 
Laskey et al. , 1986) or produce an analysis of how the posterior prob­
abilities would depend on the priors if they were specified. Let us try 
such an analysis for Example 1. The posterior probability of {yes} is 
always 0; if the prior probabilities of {no} and T are in ratio a:l, 
their posterior probabilities are in ratio 
Pr(A={no}I E) 
Pr(A=TIE) 
Pr(A={no};E) 
Pr(A=T;E) 
2a 
1 
Pr(s2,{no}) 
Pr(s1,T) 
(5) 
A ratio of 2:1, as in the Shaferian belief function, means to a Bayesian 
an implicit assumption of a-1, or equal prior probabilities. 
On reflection, Equation (5) , a special case of Williams' result, should 
not seem surprising. A Bayesian model of the coded message problem 
requires a complete probability model over Sx2T. Our model was based on 
two assumptions, both of which seem to arise naturally from the sense of 
the example. The first is that the codes are chosen independently of 
the plaintext message (the spy's actual observation) . The second as­
sumption is that the codes are chosen at random with prior probability 
(i.e. before conditioning on the content of the coded message) P(·) . 
For the Bayesian posterior probability to match the belief function, we 
would need a third requirement: that the posterior probability of each 
plaintext message given the observed message BANANA is equal to the 
prior probability of the code transforming the plaintext message into 
the message BANANA. It is not surprising that this third condition 
holds only when the prior odds ratio is equal to 1. 
But Shafer clearly does not intend the basic probability of a set to be 
the posterior probability given E that it was the true plaintext mes­
sage. Rather, as discussed above, a belief function is an incompletely 
specified probability model. Probabilities are specified for the codes, 
but no probability model is given for T, either unconditionally or con­
ditional on the codes in S. Since there is no joint distribution over 
Sx2T, we may not condition on the full evidence E. Rather, we condition 
the distribution over S on the set s1 of codes which could have occurred 
given the message q. Shafer defends this as an intuitively plausible 
way to assign beliefs when no probability model is given for T or its 
relation to S. 
We see, then, that a Bayesian and a Shaferian would operate differently 
on Shafer's own canonical example. Given a partially specified prob­
ability model, the Shaferian adopts a partial conditioning approach that 
avoids the issue of probabilities on plaintext messages. The Bayesian 
regards the Shaferian's results as implicitly determining probabilities 
on the plaintext messages. Dempster's Rule follows from Shaferian par­
tial conditioning; to a Bayesian, it requires implicit but untenable as­
sumptions (equal prior probabilities on the component plaintext 
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messages; and that learning one plaintext message A1 tells us nothing 
about the other plaintext message A2) .  
5. A Second Example 
We have established that belief functions are not Bayesian. Our second 
example shows why it matters: the example results in the identical 
belief function as Example 1, but the Bayesian posterior probabilities 
must be different. 
Example 2: The same spy as in Example 1 observes the same plain­
text message, and again sends a message using one of two possible 
codes. The first code of Example 1 is replaced by a new code that 
distinguishes only between confirmation and nonconfirmation of the 
attack; the second code is left unchanged. The codes are: 
s1'({yes}) =APPL E; 
s2({yes}) =APPLE; 
s1'((no}) = s1'(T) =BANANA. 
s2((no}) - BANANA; s2(T) - CHERRY. 
The probabilities of the codes are the same as in Example 1: P(s1) 
1/3 and P(s2) - 2/3. 
In this example, the constraining relation is given byE' - ((s1' ,(no}) , 
(s1' ,T), (s2 ,(no}) }. The compatibility sets, however, are the same as 
in Example 1: C(s1') - T and C(s2) - {no}. Thus, the basic probability 
assignments (3) apply to this example, and belief in no attack is again 
2/3. 
A Bayesian analysis of this example begins with the same prior odds 
ratio a:l for (no} and T as for Example 1. The posterior odds ratio is 
then 
Pr(A-(no} I E) 
Pr(A=TIE) 
Pr(s1' ,{no}) + Pr(s2,(no}) 
Pr(s1' , T) 
a(l/3) + a(2/3) 3a 
1/3 1 
(6) 
In other words, in Example 1, learning that the message was BANANA mul­
tiplies by a factor of 2 the prior odds ratio for plaintext message {no} 
versus T. In Example 2, the prior odds ratio is multiplied by 3. 
Regardless of prior probability, no Bayesian would assign equal beliefs 
in these two examples, yet the resulting belief functions are identical. 
Example 2 differs from the examples used by Shafer in that there is no 
unique decoding of the code s1'. But to disallow the example by 
Shafer's criterion, we would have to argue that S' does not mediate the 
interaction between the coded message and T. Yet in Example 1 it is 
supposed to be clear that the observed message does bear on T only 
through its relevance to which code in S ws chosen. This argument would 
not seem to be affected by the double assignment of the codeword BANANA 
in Example 2. 
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6. Discussion 
To a Bayesian, it is clear that belief in no attack should be higher in 
the second example than in the first. Everything about the two examples 
is identical, except that in Example 2, the first code might have been 
used on a plaintext message {no}. That is, the spy's having observed 
that there would be no attack is compatible with either code in Example 
2, but only with s2 in Example 1. Therefore, belief in no attack should 
be higher in Example 2. 
A Shaferian would argue differently. In both examples, the second code 
implies that the enemy will not attack. In neither example does the 
first code imply anything about the enemy's intention (while the spy 
could have observed {no} in Example 2, she could also have observed T). 
Therefore, our belief in no attack should be equal to the probability of 
the second code, and our uncommitted belief should be equal to the prob­
ability of the first code. 
Which analysis is "correct?" The answer to this question goes to the 
heart of the philosophical debate between Bayesians and Shaferians. To 
a Bayesian, even when a probability model is left unspecified, implica­
tions of such a model if it were specified should be preserved. To a 
Shaferian, if it makes no sense to specify a probability model for part 
of a problem, there is no reason to be bound by the implications of such 
a model. 
If you accept equal beliefs for Examples 1 and 2, then you probably ac­
cept (1) and (2) as reasonable formulae for deriving beliefs on a frame 
T from probabilities on a related frame S. Since Dempster's Rule fol­
lows from (1) and (2), you should accept that also. If, on the other 
hand, you feel that belief in no attack should be higher for Example 2, 
then you disagree with how beliefs are assigned for the canonical ex­
amples Shafer uses to justify his theory. In complex problems, this 
foundational disagreement may have implications that are not so clear as 
in the simple example of this paper. 
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